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NOTE
THE EFFECTS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT:
A CASE STUDY
"WHATEVER POSITION YOU HAVE ACHIEVED, SOMEBODY PAID A PRICE TO
OPEN THE DOOR FOR YOU."
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act) in order to
end a century of transgressions against minority voting rights.2 The first
goal of the Act-to eradicate the use of "tests or devices" that hinder
registration of minority voters-has, for the most part, been met.3
However, the Act's second goal-to empower minority voters-is only
beginning to be fulfilled in some areas of the country.'
This Note analyzes the Voting Rights Act, concluding that its effective-
ness is limited and demonstrating this conclusion with a case study. Part
II of this Note demonstrates that Congress took a piecemeal approach to
correcting racial negatives in voting systems that only became truly
effective in the 1980s. Part III illustrates the positive effects of the 1982
amendments to section 2 of the Act. This Part focuses on the cases
brought under that section in one parish5 in Louisiana. Finally, using that
parish and recent cases in the United States Supreme Court, Part IV
suggests that because the Act has achieved its potential and because of
complications with broader implementation of the Act, the day is near that
1. Reverend At Sharpton, quoted in Jim Sleepo, A Man of Too Many Parts, THE NEW YORKER,
Jan. 25, 1993, at 65.
2. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
3. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 183.
Some commentators state that the only goal of the Act was the registration of blacks and that any other
"goals" of the Act developed after the Act's implementation. See, e.g., ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM,
WHOSE VOTES COUNT9 3-4 (1987).
4. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 9-15, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 180-92. Some say
that the strength of the black vote rests in the ability of blacks to influence the outcome of elections.
Others believe that strength rests in the ability to elect black candidates. This Note contends that there
remains room under either definition for improving the equality of black suffrage. The Act, however,
has not been wholly ineffective. See infra part III.
5. A parish in Louisiana is equivalent to a county in other states. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 856 (1985). See also I U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the Act will have outlived its utility.6 Further empowerment of the black
community will only come with improved education and increased political
awareness.
II. CONGRESSIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS
A. 1870 - 1965
The main purpose of the Civil War Amendments7 was to ensure that
states would not infringe upon the civil rights of blacks following
emancipation.8 Congress enacted the Enforcement Act of 1870 in order
to compel states to comply with the newly adopted amendments."0 For
a time, black suffrage influenced politics in all states." Nevertheless, by
the early 1890s, some states began to ignore the law, and a new era of
discrimination arose.'2
In particular, some southern states began to implement prerequisites to
registration and voting, such as tests and other devices, 3 explicitly
6. For a discussion of alternative views on the success of the Voting Rights Act and the future
of voting rights in America, see Lani Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the Post-Reagan Era,
24 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 393 (1989); Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 VA. L. REV. 1413 (1991); Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act
and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077 (1991); Edward Still, Voluntary
Constituencies: Modified At-Large Voting as a Remedyfor Minority Vote Dilution in Judicial Elections,
9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 354 (1991); Dana R. Castarphen, Current Topic in Law and Policy, The
Single Transferable Vote: Achieving the Goals of Section 2 Without Sacrificing the Integration Ideal,
9 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 405 (1991).
7. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are
commonly referred to as the Civil War Amendments. Sections 1 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
and the entire Fifteenth Amendment are important to voting rights.
8. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971).
9. The Enforcement Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
10. See S. REP. No. 162, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2508,
2541. Within one year, Congress enacted a second statute, 16 Stat. 4313 (1871), which provided for
the appointment of federal election supervisors.
11. See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA, Second
Day, at 4-5 (1868), reprinted in THE AMERICAN NEGRO-HIS HISTORY AND LITERATURE: PROCEEDINGS
OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF SOUTH CAROLINA 13, 16-17 (William L. Katz ed., 1968).
12. See S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 35, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2541-42. By
1894, Congress had repealed the bulk of the statute. Id.
13. These states included Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia. Id. The devices used included reading or writing tests, an application form,
oral constitutional interpretation tests, understanding the duties of citizenship, and good morals
requirements. Id. Election officials could grade most tests subjectively. United States v. Louisiana,
380 U.S. 145, 150 (1965).
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designed to hinder or prevent black suffrage.' 4 During this time, literacy
tests were especially effective because considerably more blacks than
whites were illiterate."t Exacerbating the problem, steps were taken to
exempt illiterate whites from these disqualifications. 6
The Supreme Court quickly began to address the constitutionality of
these tests and practices and consistently struck down one discriminatory
device after another. 7 Each time the Court invalidated a discriminatory
law, the states developed new devices to continue to suppress the rights of
blacks to register and vote.'8
By the 1950s, Congress realized that measures had to be taken to stem
the open prejudice. 9 Congress hoped to end the woes when it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1957 (1957 Act).20 The 1957 Act sought to prevent
any interference, including intimidation, with blacks' right to vote2 by
granting the Attorney General the power to bring suits to enjoin state
laws22 that promoted discriminatory rules regarding voting practices.23
14. S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 34 n.1, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2541-42.
IS. Id. (citing census of 1890) ("[I]n 1890, 69 percent or more of the adult Negroes in seven
Southern States which adopted these tests were illiterate.. . .'). See also Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954) ("Education of Negroes was almost non-existent, and practically all of the
race were illiterate. In fact, any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states.").
16. S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 35, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2542. The means
included grandfather clauses, property qualifications, morals tests, and the ability to comprehend certain
constitutional provisions. Id. If white voters did not meet the first two criteria, election officials could
nevertheless judge the remaining criteria subjectively to prevent the disqualification of white voters.
Id. at 35-36.
17. Id. at 35 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (invalidating racial gerrymander-
ing); United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960) (invalidating discriminatory challenges); Schnell v.
Davis, 336 U.S. 933 (1949) (invalidating discriminatory application of voting tests); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649 (1944) (invalidating solely white primaries); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939)
(invalidating "onerous procedural requirements"); and Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915)
(invalidating grandfather clauses)).
18. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183 (quoting South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966)).
19. H.R. REP. No. 291, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1966,
1970. Congress realized the need for "a more effective enforcement" of constitutional rights, especially
the right to vote. Id.
20. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971 (1988)).
21. Id. § 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1988)).
22. Id. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1988)). The Attorney General could also
bring suits against private individuals. Id.
23. Id. The 1957 Act also created the Civil Rights Commission, whose duty, among others, was
to investigate civil rights violations involving the right to vote. Id. §§ 101-106, expired by operation
of law (1983) (see explanatory note preceding 42 U.S.C. § 1975 (1988)).
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However, within three years, Congress realized that the 1957 Act was
ineffective.2 4 Thus, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1960 (1960
Act) to improve on the 1957 Act.25 The 1960 Act provided additional
enforcement mechanisms and added punitive provisions26 in an attempt to
give the Attorney General a practical tool to defeat the continuing
egregious practices employed in some states.2
Once again, in 1964, problems enforcing the 1960 Act forced Congress
to reassess the civil rights situation.2" The 1964 Civil Rights Ace 9
endeavored to remedy the lengthy delays plaintiffs experienced in suits
brought under the previous acts by mandating that the district courts give
priority to voting rights cases.3" The 1964 Act also sought to eliminate
the discriminatory application of literacy tests by requiring the states to
apply uniform standards to all applicants."
24. S. REP. No. 1205, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1925, 1926.
25. Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 20 U.S.C.).
26. Id. Title III provided that state election officials must keep records of all prerequisites to
voting. Title III also required the official to turn over the records to the Attorney General upon his or
her request. A failure to do so could result in a fine or imprisonment. Id. §§ 301-03 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1974 (1988)).
Title VI provided that if a court found that a person had brought a successful suit under § 131 of
the 1957 Act, then the Attorney General could institute a hearing to determine whether the particular
case was part of a pattern of discrimination or merely an aberration. In the event that the Attorney
General proved a pattern of discrimination in the jurisdiction, the court could appoint voting referees
to overlook the registration of applicants. Id. § 601 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(c)
(1988)).
Congress rejected an alternate Title VI which would have allowed the President to appoint a federal
enrollment officer for those districts where either (1) a successful suit under the 1957 Act had been
brought or (2) the Civil Rights Commission determined that persons had been denied the right to
register and vote in a particular district. The proposed bill would have allowed the states to challenge
the qualifications of a voter but only after the elections had been held. See S. REP. No. 1205, supra
note 24, at 1-6, reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1925-30.
27. See H.R. REP. No. 956, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.$.C.C.A.N.
1939, 1944-45. Without access to the election records and without a suitable punitive provision to help
enforce the provision, the Attorney General often had no case. Id.
28. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391,
2394.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended at
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 28 U.S.C.).
30. Id. § 101(d) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a) (1988)). Section 101(d) provided
that the Attorney General could request and have the circuit judge "immediately" appoint a three-judge
panel to hear any voting rights case in which the United States was a plaintiff.
31. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 101 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1971(a) (1988)). Section 101(a) provided that literacy tests be standardized, administered in written
form, and that the applicant be given a copy of the test if he requested. Section 101(b) created a
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By the following year, Congress recognized that the "case-by-case"
approach opted for in the Civil Rights Acts was inept. It simply could not
assure blacks any meaningful progress with respect to the right to vote.32
First, voting rights litigation was lengthy and remedies slow in coming.33
Staunch local opposition often greeted successful suits. 34  Local election
officials either purged or froze registration rolls in order to circumvent
remedies awarded by the courts.35 Furthermore, the net result in the
increase of black voters was negligible, especially in the South where the
most grievous cases of discrimination endured.36
B. The Voting Rights Act of 1965
Congress designed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the Act) to correct the
deficiencies inherent in the civil rights acts37 and attack the problem of
low black voter registration.38 In order to accomplish its goals, Congress
aimed the Act's remedies at registration for all elections, not merely federal
elections,39 in those states4" that had a history of employing discriminato-
ry voter registration practices." Section 6 of the Act set out provisions
rebuttable presumption that any applicant who had completed the sixth grade was literate for purposes
of voting in a federal election. Id.
32. H.R. REP. No. 439, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437,
2441.
33. Id. Success in the courts came only after years of expense and effort. Id.
34. For example, Louisiana switched to the constitutional interpretation test when the Supreme
Court declared all-white primaries illegal. See infra text accompanying notes 131-34.
35. H.R. REP. No. 439, supra note 32, at 5, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2441 (citing United
States v. McElveen, 180 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. La.), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58
(1960) (illustrating that Louisiana parish purged 91% of black voters from the rolls for spelling or
grammatical errors on application, but did not remove whites who made similar mistakes on their
applications). See also United States v. Palmer, 356 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1966) (detailing that Louisiana
parish closed its registration offices on the day a federal court struck down Louisiana's constitutional
interpretation test).
36. H.R. REP,. No. 439, supra note 32, at 5, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2441. In Alabama,
the number of black registered voters increased 5.2% between 1958 and 1964; in Mississippi, there was
a two percentage point increase in the ten years preceding 1965; and in Louisiana, there was a 0.1
percentage point increase in the nine years preceding 1965.
37. S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 37, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2544.
38. See S. RE'. No. 417, supra note 3, at 7, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183.
39. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 14(c), 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 19731 (1988)).
40. The Voting Rights Act also covered some counties even though the states in which they were
located were not fully covered. See infra note 43.
41. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-I (1988)). The Act designated a state as a "target state" if two factors
were present: (1) prior use of a voting test or practice utilized as a precondition to voting registration
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to expedite the registration process42 in these "target states. 43  Section
4 suspended the use of all tests these states employed as preconditions to
registering black voters.44 Perhaps more importantly, section 5 sought to
alleviate the lengthy delays of case-by-case litigation by providing a
mechanism to screen changes in state voting laws and procedures before a
target state enacted them as law.' Lastly, section 2 outlawed the use of
any scheme designed to deny, on a racial basis, the right to vote. 6
Finally, Congress had developed a weapon to combat voter discrimination
in those states that had persistently silenced the voice of blacks in the
electoral process.47
Furthermore, section 648 authorized the Civil Service Commission to
appoint and send federal examiners to inspect registrants and prepare lists
of people eligible to vote.49 Section 6 proved to be a successful mecha-
nism in avoiding the problems of reluctant registrars.
Congress also determined that certain tests and devices, such as literacy
tests, were not genuine preconditions to voting. Rather, due to inequitable
administration in the past, they were tools of discrimination."0 Section 4
banned the use of all tests and other prerequisites to voting in "target
states" for five years."
In an attempt to combat the shortcomings of the previous civil rights
and (2) less than 50% of the voting age population was registered to vote on November 1, 1964, or less
than 50% of the voting age population voted in the 1964 presidential election. Id.
42. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 6, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1971e (1988)).
43. The "target states" at the time of the enactment of the bill were Alabama, Alaska, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia. One county each in Arizona, Idaho, and Maine
were covered as well as 34 counties in North Carolina. H.R. REP. No. 439, supra note 32, at 9,
reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2445. On November 19, 1965, two more counties in Arizona, one
county in Idaho, and one county in Hawaii were added. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S.
301, 318 (1966).
44. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4(a), 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. 1973b (1988)).
45. Id. § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988)).
46. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
47. See S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 48, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2556.
48. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 6, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973d (1988)).
49. Id.
50. S. REP. No. 162, supra note 10, at 43, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2551.
51. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 4, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1973b (1988)). Congress extended the ban on tests and devices in 1970, 1975, and 1982. See
notes following text at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1988).
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acts, section 5 provided a screening mechanism for any proposed voting
procedure changes. The greatest failure of the former acts had been that
the Attorney General bore the burden of proving that specific practices
were indeed discriminatory in effect.52 Accordingly, by the time that the
government had proved its case, states would have already held elections
or would have changed the allegedly discriminatory devices. 3 Section 5,
however, mandated that target states preclear with the Attorney General or
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia all proposed
changes in their voting laws and procedures before enacting them as
law. 4 This afforded the federal government the opportunity to reject
discriminatory practices, designed to dilute the black vote, before a state
could impose them, effectively forcing states to seek declaratory judg-
ments. 5 Furthermore, the burden was on the state to prove that the
changes were not discriminatory. 6
Most of the vote dilution claims not covered by section 5 were brought
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather
than under the more specific section 2 of the Act.57 Plaintiffs turned to
the Constitution because the scope of section 2 was not clear. It was
viewed as an innocuous provision" that merely restated the terms of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 9
52. See H.R. REP. No. 439, supra note 32, at 6, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2442.
53. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2441-42.
54. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c (1988)).
55. Id.
56. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); see also Procedures for the Administration
of § 5, 28 C.F.Rt § 51.52 (1992) (submitting party has the burden of showing change has neither a
discriminatory purpose nor effect).
57. Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the
Intent Standard, 69 VA. L. REv. 715, 727-28 (1983).
58. Id.
59. The original section 2 read: "No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Voting Rights
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988)).
19941
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C. Judicial Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act60
To a great extent, the Act accomplished its goal of registering black
voters in a short amount of time.6" Sections 4 and 6 were successful in
clearing the way for black voters to register.62 Because blacks were
beginning to register to vote in large numbers, southern states developed
new schemes to dilute the strength of the black vote.
As noted above,63 section 5 of the Act prevented target states from
enacting legislation that attempted to dilute or resulted in diluted black
voting strength without gaining preclearance from the federal govem-
ment. '  Thus, the strength of section 5 depended upon a court's analysis
of a state's "standard, practice or procedure."
In Allen v. State Board of Elections,6' the Supreme Court held that a
Mississippi law, which sought to change from district to at-large elections
the manner of electing county supervisors, came under the purview of
section 5.66 Clearly, this signified a victory for blacks in vote dilution
cases because it illustrated the Court's willingness to allow the Attorney
60. Several southern states attacked the constitutionality of certain sections (sections 4(a)-(d), 5,
6(b), 7, 9, 13(a), and 14) of the Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The
Supreme Court upheld the sections of the Act on the basis that "Congress may use any rational means
to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting." Id. at 324 (citing Heart
of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964)).
The Court recognized that section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment authorized Congress to enforce the
article with "appropriate legislation." The Court acknowledged that the legislation had tackled the
problem of minority voting rights in an "inventive manner" but that Congress' actions were a legitimate
response to the inadequacy of the case-by-case approach. Id. at 325-27.
61. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 6, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 183.
62. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
63. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
64. Section 5 read, in relevant part:
Whenever a [target area] shall enact or seek to administer any voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from
that in force or effect on November 1, 1964 ... such State or subdivision may institute an
action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for a declaratory
judgment that such qualification, prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have
the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account
of race or color ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
65. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). Mississippi plaintiffs sought to revoke changes in the laws that would
allow for certain elective positions to become appointed positions. Also, a second group of Mississippi
plaintiffs sought to prevent the State from changing the requirements independent candidates must meet
to run in an election. Virginia plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a law allowing handwritten
ballots violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
66. Id. at 569 (concluding that the purposes of the statute and the volumes of legislative history
clearly indicated that § 5 would apply to the changes in question).
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General to flush out discriminatory practices otherwise disguised as
legitimate state or local concerns.67
Although the Court had sharpened section 5's teeth, the question
remained whether the Act would afford blacks the same protection when
particular voting schemes were already in place or in areas of the country
not covered by section 4. Initially, attempts to challenge already-existing
practices were brought under the Fifteenth Amendment. The Supreme
Court first required only proof of discriminatory effect to find a violation
under the Fifteenth Amendment,6" but ultimately the Court required proof
of discriminatory intent to find a constitutional violation.69 As a result,
Congress amended section 2 in 1982 to require only a showing of
discriminatory effects to prove a statutory violation.
In Reynolds v. Sims,7" blacks scored a partial victory when the Supreme
Court mandated that states should apportion legislative districts with equal
population. This ensured that each person's vote was no stronger nor
weaker than the next person's. 2 The "one man, one vote" principle laid
down in Reynolds set the stage for equal representation. However, with the
advent of the Voting Rights Act, it became increasingly evident that equal
representation should also encompass the principle that state legislatures
should draw districts so as to assure that each voter secured adequate
67. The Court decided several cases in Allen. The Court held that § 5 also reaches reapportion-
ment and attempts to alter the number of seats composing a government body. Id.
68. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
70. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The plaintiffs alleged that the disparity in population among the
legislative districts deprived them of "equal suffrage in free and equal elections" contrary to the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 540. Counties with a small population were able to elect roughly the same
number of representatives as the most populous counties. For example, a county with a population of
16,000 and a county with a population of over 600,000 both could elect one state senator. Similarly,
a county with a population of less than 14,000 could elect two representatives to the state house of
representatives while a county with a population of over 300,000 was only entitled to three
representatives. Id. at 545-56.
71. Id. at 575-76. The Court held that the federal Constitution demanded that "both houses of the
legislature be apportioned on a population basis." Id. at 576. The Court clarified that "equal"
population should not be taken literally, but that the population differences among the districts should
be kept at a minimal deviation. Id. at 577. The Court also concluded that a case-by-case approach
would determine what deviation was minimal. Id. at 578.
72. The Court's holding assured that people living in urban areas with a higher concentration of
blacks would be represented by a number of legislators proportional to those living in rural,
predominantly white, areas. Therefore, the rural areas could no longer control the legislatures. See
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568-71.
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representation.'
A line of cases following Reynolds focused on the use of electoral
mechanisms which "submerged" the strength of minority voters. Plaintiffs
in Fortson v. Dorsey74 and Whitcomb v. Chavis" each brought similar
challenges against multimember, at-large districts under the Equal
Protection Clause. Minority plaintiffs argued that the boundaries of these
districts resulted in the submergence of the minority vote. The Supreme
Court was unwilling to accept that the multimember districts were per se
violations of the Equal Protection Clause.76 Moreover, the Court
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove in these particular cases that the
multimember districts "operate[d] to minimize or cancel out the voting
strength" of the minority voters.77 However, the Court did not foreclose
a situation in which the effects of a particular electoral scheme could
indeed prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.78 Within two
years of Chavis, the Court did come across just such a case.
In White v. Regester,79 the Supreme Court heard a Texas legislative
reapportionment case in which the plaintiffs, blacks and hispanics in urban
counties, challenged the use of multimember, at-large legislative dis-
tricts.8" The Court held that under the "totality of the circumstances,"'"
73. Note, Chavis v. Whitcomb: Apportionment, Gerrymandering, and Black Voting Rights, 24
RuTGERS L. REv. 521, 550 (1970). There were many ways for the black vote to be canceled even
though there were more blacks registered to vote than at any time in American history. For example,
a large concentration of black voters in an area could be diffused by splitting the area among several
districts thus creating several areas of black minority votes. Or, an at-large system could be created
where before there had been a district voting system. In that case, though blacks may be 45% of the
total population and able to control several districts, the at-large system would enable the white vote
to elect all of the representatives though they were only a narrow majority.
74. 379 U.S. 433 (1965). Plaintiffs in Georgia argued that multimember districts permitted voters
in the district at-large to defeat candidates that a particular subdistrict could have elected if it were a
single-member district.
75. 403 U.S. 124 (1971). Black plaintiffs in Indiana complained that multimember districts
prevented the proportional election of candidates who lived in the ghetto.
76. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 438-39; Chavis, 403 U.S. at 147.
77. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439. The Court noted that the plaintiffs had not offered any evidence
that the electoral mechanism suppressed their vote. Id.; see also Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149. The Court
stated that the plaintiffs had not produced any evidence that the districts were "conceived or operated
as purposeful devices to further racial discrimination." 403 U.S. at 149. The Court concluded that the
reason that blacks had not been elected was political defeat and not "bias against poor Negroes." Id.
at 153.
78. Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439; Chavis, 403 U.S. at 159-60.
79. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
80. Id. The Court still refused to hold that multimember districts were per se unconstitutional. Id.
at 765. The Court also rejected the notion that disproportionate representation by itself was evidence
of a discriminatory device. Id. at 765-66.
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the multimember districts operated to preclude the effective participation
of blacks and hispanics in the political process.82 The Court did not look
to the intent of the Texas legislature; instead, it focused on the "intensely
local appraisal" of the relationship between the multimember districts and
the history of racial discrimination and their persistent effects on "educa-
tion, employment, economics, health and politics" within the communi-
ties. 3
For several years, lower courts used the criteria established in White, and
later modified by the Fifth Circuit in Zimmer v. McKeithen,"4 in order to
determine whether certain electoral mechanisms resulted in the discrimina-
tion against blacks and other minorities at the polls. However, in Mobile
v. Bolden85 the Court seemingly shifted the focus of its analysis to
concentrate on the presence of discriminatory intent behind an electoral
mechanism rather than its effects. 6 A plurality of the Court found that
the plaintiffs had not provided evidence that the Alabama legislature "con-
ceived or operated" the at-large electoral system in Mobile to advance
81. The "totality of circumstances" included the following factors: (1) that the minority group
constituted an "identifiable class for Fourteenth Amendment purposes"; (2) that a "history of racial
discrimination" in the state and in the counties existed; (3) that the state used a majority vote
requirement in the primary election; (4) that the past success of black candidates with the slating process
was low; and (5) that candidates had resorted to "racial campaign tactics." Id. at 766-67.
The Court looked toward the cultural and economic realities of Bexar, the San Antonio county at
issue in White, for guidance. Most hispanics in the county were poor, and language and cultural
barriers separated them from the mainstream. Additionally, there was evidence of discrimination with
respect to education, employment, health, and politics. Id. at 767-69.
The Fifth Circuit later refined the totality of the circumstances test in Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485
F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), afl'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S.
636 (1976).
82. White, 412 U.S. at 765. The Court stated that:
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes
leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in
question-that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to
participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.
Id. at 766 (citing Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149-50).
83. Id. at 767-69.
84. 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1973) (en bane), aff'd sub nom. East Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
85. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
86. The plurality criticized the district court's reliance on Zimmer. The opinion stated that Zimmer
was "quite evidently decided upon the misunderstanding that it is not necessary to show a
discriminatory purpose in order to prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause-that proof of a
discriminatory effect is sufficient." Id. at 71 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)).
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discrimination."
Civil rights advocates viewed the Bolden decision as a stunning
defeat. 8 The black citizens of Mobile had successfully alleged in the
district court that the at-large system for electing the three-person city
commission prevented them from electing a candidate of their choice.
The district court premised its finding for the plaintiffs on the Zimmer
criteria.9" First, although blacks comprised approximately thirty-five
percent of the population, no black candidate had ever won an election to
the commission.9 The white voting bloc could consistently defeat any
black candidate.92 Second, the court stated that the commission discrimi-
nated against blacks in job opportunities and community services. 93
Third, the court found no preference for at-large districts in the state.94
Finally, the district court examined the history of "official discrimination
in Alabama." 95
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected the district court's conclu-
87. Id. at 66 (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)). In Washington, the Court
rejected a claim by black plaintiffs that the Washington D.C. Police Department's use of a qualifying
test was discriminatory solely on evidence that a disproportionate number of black applicants had failed.
Washington, 426 U.S. at 233. The Court held that proof of discriminatory purpose was essential to
make out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 239. The Court did not discard
disproportionate impact as a relevant factor, but it made it clear that it was only one factor that might
tend to prove discriminatory purpose. Id. at 241-42. See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977), quoted in Mobile, 446 U.S. at 67 ("Proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
88. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Black Complaints Haven't Translated Into Political Organization and
Power, 12 NAT'L J. at 967 (June 14, 1980). See also S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 26, reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 203 (recognizing that the number of new vote dilution cases had curtailed
sharply).
89. Bolden v. Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384,399 (S.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd, 571 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978),
rev'd, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
90. The court analyzed each of the Zimmer factors in turn. Id. at 399-402. See iqfra text
accompanying notes 91-94 for a discussion of these criteria.
91. Bolden, 423 F. Supp. at 399. The court concluded that although the parties did not have a
slating scheme in Mobile County, the system nevertheless discouraged blacks from running in the at-
large district. Id.
92. Id. The court held that polarized voting closed the electoral system to blacks and was an
example of the "barrier to effective participation" of which White and Zimmer warned. Id. at 399-400.
93. Id. at 400. The court noted that Mobile reluctantly desegregated public facilities and even then
only upon the orders of the court. Id. It also recognized that the city commissioners had failed to
appoint blacks to municipal committees, integral divisions of the city government. Id.
94. Id. at 400-01.
95. Id. at 401. The court also relied on the "enhancing factors" laid out in Zimmer. Id.
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sions96 and insisted that the plaintiffs had not provided evidence that
would prove the state had adopted or maintained the plan for discriminatory
reasons.97 The Court thus brought the future of minority voting rights
into question by requiring the nearly impossible proof of discriminatory
intent.9"
Congress reacted sharply to the Bolden decision and amended section 2
of the Voting Rights Act," which previously had been considered "so
perilous.""° The new section 2"'1 codified the results test established
in White and refined in Zimmer.l1 2  After this amendment, plaintiffs
96. 446 U.S. at 72-74. The Court acknowledged the history of discrimination in Alabama, but did
not accept that the district court's evaluation proved discriminatory intent. Id. at 74. The Court
reasoned that blacks had not won elections because only three inexperienced black candidates had ever
run, and the black community did not support them with any amount of zeal. Id. at 73 n.19. The Court
also believed that evidence of discrimination by the commission against blacks was circumstantial at
best. Id. Furthermore, the Court thought that the proper focus should have been directed to whether
the state legislature, rather than the commissioners, purposely discriminated against blacks. Id. at 74
n.20.
97. Indeed, the plaintiffs' burden was difficult. The Mobile City commission originated in 1911.
Id. at 59.
98. Commentators believed that it would be nearly impossible for plaintiffs to prove discriminatory
intent. First, a plaintiff would have to prove the intent of a group of legislators, not just one lawmaker.
Second, many systems in question had been developed decades before. For example, the at-large
districts in Alabama were a result of a 1911 law. Third, legislators would be reluctant to divulge their
reasons for enacting "discriminatory" laws, especially if they had acted with discriminatory intent.
Finally, many courts had adopted rules that forbade legislators from being cross-examined to discover
their motivations. Parker, supra note 57, at 740-41. See also Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225
(1971) (noting the difficulty in disceming a group's motivation).
99. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 205.
100. See Parker, supra note 57, at 727-28.
101. The amended section 2 reads:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall
be imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2) of this title,
as provided in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of the
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of
citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect
representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). See supra note 59 for text of original § 2.
102. The Senate Judiciary Committee set out circumstances which could be probative of a violation
of the section. The circumstances to be considered were a history of official discrimination by the state
or local goverment, existing racial polarization of elections, suspect voting procedures and districting
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
would only have to prove that the current electoral mechanism in their
political subdivision, accompanied by historic social inequities in that
subdivision, hindered blacks from participating on equal ground with whites
in the political process." 3 The amendment made it clear that it was no
longer necessary for plaintiffs in vote dilution cases to prove discriminatory
intent. t a However, the so-called "Dole Compromise" made it equally
clear that section 2 was not to be interpreted to give any class of voters an
entitlement to proportional representation. 5
The amendment of section 2 meant that subsequent vote dilution cases
would be statutory rather than constitutional claims.0 6 Thornburg v.
Ginglest°7 afforded the Supreme Court its first chance to interpret the
scope of the new section 2.
In Gingles, a group of black citizens challenged the redistricting plan for
North Carolina's state legislature."0 8 The district court analyzed the
evidence presented under the Zimmer factors and determined that portions
of the plan did in fact violate section 2.109 While the Supreme Court
schemes, a denial of minority access to a candidate slating process, the effects of discrimination on the
lives of minorities, racial overtures in political campaigns, and the number of minorities elected to office
in the jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 28-29, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2, 15-16, 27, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 179, 192-93, 205. The Senate Report
gave three reasons why the intent test was inappropriate. First, the relevance of the perhaps 100-year
old motives behind a law is minimal if the goal is to include minorities in the political process today.
Id. at 36, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 214. Second, the intent test is divisive because minority
plaintiffs must rely on a charge of racism against local officials and the community as a whole. Yet,
these charges of racism certainly cannot promote racial harmony, an equally important goal. Id.
Finally, the burden of proof would be nearly impossible to meet. Id. See also supra note 98.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1973. The "Dole Compromise," named for its primary sponsor, Kansas Senator
Robert Dole, was the last clause of § 1973. See supra note 101 for text of this section. For judicial
support of the same principle, see White, 412 U.S. at 766 and Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149.
Furthermore, the Senate Report acknowledged that at-large electoral schemes were not per se
violative of § 2. S. REI'. No. 417, supra note 3, at 16, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 193. The
Senate Report also clarified that § 2 did not assume racially polarized voting existed in any political
subdivision. Section 2 required that the plaintiffs prove such a pattern in vote dilution cases. Id. at 29,
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206.
106. For example, in Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Supreme Court noted that the
district court had only addressed the plaintiffs' § 2 claim and had not reached their Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendment claims. Id. at 38.
107. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
108. Id. at 35. The suit challenged "one single member and six multi-member districts" created by
the 1982 North Carolina General Assembly. Id.
109. Id. at 37-38. First, the district court found that black citizens comprised a recognizable class
of minority voters in the districts and that the State of North Carolina had a history of discrimination
against blacks with the right to vote. Id. at 38-39. It also found that, historically, blacks had inferior
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recognized the relevance of the Zimmer factors, n1 it devised three
necessary preconditions that plaintiffs had to establish in order for courts
to hold that an electoral mechanism violates section 2:"' 1) the minority
group must be sufficiently large and geographically isolated to create a
majority in a single-member district;"' 2) the minority group must
consistently vote as one;"' and 3) a majority voting bloc must consistent-
ly defeat the preferred candidates of the minority group." 4 With this
formulation the Court basically established a permissive standard for vote
dilution cases-if a minority group can bring a viable remedy to court,
prove that it has been unable to elect its candidates, and prove that voters
vote along racial lines, then the group has made a claim.'
Gingles, furthermore, showcased a split in the Supreme Court. Justice
O'Connor, speaking for four members of the Court, expressed her concerns
that the majority test significantly altered the "totality of the circumstances
test" 1 6 and, thereby, broadened the scope of section 2 well beyond
"education, housing, employment and health services" which contributed to their inability "to participate
effectively in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." Id. at 39. The court
found that existing mechanisms still prevented black candidates from being elected. Id. at 39-40. It
found that whites voted in a bloc and that candidates appealed to racial prejudices. Id. at 40.
Furthermore, black candidates had not enjoyed any consistent success in past elections. Finally, the
court noted that there was racially polarized voting in the districts. Id. at 40-41.
110. Id. at 48.
111. In a footnote, the Court noted that some of the Zimmer factors were more dispositive than
others. For example, the Court concluded that the extent to which minority candidates were successful
and the extent to which voters split along racial lines were the most important factors. The remaining
factors were "supportive of, but not essential to, a minority voter's claim." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15.
112. Id. at 50. The Court reasoned that if the group was not large enough in a relatively small area,
then the multimember district was not the culprit that disabled the group's effective participation in the
political process. Id. (relying on James V. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to
City of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment?, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1982)).
113. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51. If the minority group could not unite to support a candidate, then
the creation of a single-member district would not likely remedy the situation. Id.
114. Id. Again, the minority group must prove that the majority votes in a bloc to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate. However, if blacks could occasionally elect black candidates, it would
not necessarily mean that a potential vote dilution case was dead before it reached the courthouse door.
Id.
115. Bloc voting is doubly important. It proves political cohesiveness in the minority group, and
it illuminates the obstacle of the majority vote. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
116. By defining racial bloc voting and minority voting strength in set terms and using electoral
results, Justice O'Connor believed that the Court directed lower courts to find a claim of vote dilution
established when a plaintiff proved that the three elements existed, rather than having courts examine
the totality of the circumstances as defined in White and Zimmer. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See
supra note 81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "totality of the circumstances" test.
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congressional intent.117 She believed that the majority's test was
rigid t1 8 and would result in proportional representation" 9 --precisely
what section 2 declared was not to occur.
20
Since the Gingles decision, commentators have stated that vote dilution
cases are much easier for minority voters to win.' State and county
governments often do not contest these cases because of the likelihood of
failure and high costs." With the operative interpretation in the Gingles
case, the piecemeal approach to solving vote dilution had finally produced
a tool effective enough to make real strides.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT ON JEFFERSON PARISH,
LOUISIANA
Louisiana has been covered by section 5 since the enactment of the
Voting Rights Act in 1965."2 Jefferson Parish is also particularly worthy
of its section 5 coverage. Jefferson Parish garnered national attention in
recent years when David Duke was elected to the state legislature from a
district within the parish 24 and when the local sheriff issued a short-lived
directive to his officers to pull over black people driving dilapidated cars
in wealthy neighborhoods."2 Jefferson Parish is still struggling to cope
with more than 150 years of racial segregation and discrimination. Only
recently has the climate begun to change. 26
Because plaintiffs in vote dilution cases still must offer a history of the
political subdivision in terms of the Zimmer factors,'27 this Note will
introduce Jefferson Parish, and to some extent Louisiana, in terms of two
117. However, Justice O'Connor noted that the legislation was a self-contradictory compromise in
that it explicitly denied a right to proportional representation but envisioned a solution for vote dilution
that necessarily contemplated "the proportion between the minority group and the electorate at large."
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 84 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 90 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (characterizing the Court's test as "simple and invariable").
119. Id. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). See supra note 101 for text of § 1973(b).
121. See THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 193.
122. Id.
123. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
124. Louisiana's Blow-dried Grand Wizard, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 23, 1989, at 27; The GOP's Cross
to Bear, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., March 6, 1989, at 14.
125. Terry E. Johnson, Mean Streets in Howard Beach, NEVSWEEK, Jan. 5, 1987, at 24.
126. See infra notes 225-28.
127. The Zimmer factors, adopted by Congress as indicated in the legislative history of the 1982
amendment to the Voting Rights Act, are set out at supra notes 91-94.
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of those factors:12 1 the history of official discrimination and the negative
effects of discrimination on the black community. However, notwithstand-
ing these disadvantages, Jefferson Parish's black community has benefitted
considerably from the Voting Rights Act. Two recent high-profile cases
have paved the way for improved minority involvement in politics.
A. History of Official Discrimination and Discriminatory Voting
Practices
Louisiana has long subjected its black population to official discrimina-
tion. Immediately following emancipation, blacks were successful in both
registering to vote and in electing black candidates to office in Louisi-
ana. 2 9 However, racial violence and intimidation characterized much of
the post-Reconstruction era.'30
Beginning in the 1890s with the fall of the Enforcement Act of
1870,131 Louisiana began to enact laws that effectively stole from black
citizens the right to vote. The 1898 Louisiana Constitution attached literacy
and property qualifications to voter eligibility and registration. 132 These
qualifications caused all but a handful of blacks to be purged from the
rolls.'33  At the same time, the constitution's "grandfather clause"
exempted the poor and illiterate whites from these requirements.'34
The Supreme Court of the United States declared the grandfather clause
unconstitutional in 1914.13 But at the beginning of the century, the
128. See Dr. Lawrence Powell, A History of Efforts by the Black Citizens of Jefferson Parish to
Implement the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 10 (unpublished). Dr. Powell chose to address the history
of Jefferson Parish in this manner. Dr. Powell's history was prepared for trial in Fifth Ward Coalition
v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., C.A. No. 86-2963 (E.D. La. 1989).
129. Powell, supra note 128, at 2-3. More than 90% of blacks in Louisiana registered to vote after
the Emancipation Act. Blacks elected black candidates to parish, state, and federal offices. In Jefferson
Parish, voters elected a black man, T. B. Stamps, to the state legislature during the Reconstruction. Id.
(citing CHARLES VINCENT, BLACK LEGISLATORS IN LOUISIANA DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1976)).
130. Id. at 3. Reconstruction in Louisiana saw "fraud, chicanery, and dirty tricks; political
assassinations and coup d'etats, armed uprisings, race riots, economic coercion, sullen noncompliance,
and a climate of generalized violence." Id. (citing JOE GRAY TAYLOR, LOUISIANA RECONSTRUCTED
1863-1877 (1974)).
131. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
132. LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 197, §§ 3-4.
133. Powell, supra note 128, at 3. Nearly 135,000 blacks registered to vote by 1890. Only 750
remained on the rolls by 1910. Id.
134. Id. at 3-4. The constitution exempted anyone whose grandfather was registered before 1867.
LA. CONST. of 1898, art. 197, § 5. Because blacks could not register before 1867, the law only applied
to whites.
135. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); see also supra note 17.
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white primary'36 was the practice most widely used to keep blacks from
the polls. 37 Louisiana was a one-party state, so the primary usually con-
trolled the outcome of the elections.'38 When the Supreme Court struck
down white primaries in 1943,39 Louisiana resorted to the "understanding
clause" that had been developed but unused since the 1921 constitu-
tion. 4 ' To implement the understanding clause, the state had utilized an
interpretation test, which was especially effective because the registrar
decided whether the applicant had passed the oral test."' During the life
of the understanding clause and interpretation tests, blacks in Jefferson
Parish had to state their age, to the day, or recite parts of the Constitution
or both in order to register."'2 The Supreme Court did not invalidate
these tests until 1965," the year Congress enacted the Voting Rights
Act.
Blacks in Jefferson Parish also suffered other forms of discrimination in
their daily lives. Blacks rode in the back of the bus and ate in black-only
restaurants." They did not dare step in public parks or enter public
swimming pools designated "white only."'45  Whites did not tolerate
blacks in their neighborhoods. Until 1971, Jefferson Parish even main-
tained segregated public schools, a practice facilitated by segregated
neighborhoods. 6 Prior to integration, black schools were inferior to
their white counterparts. 47 Separate but equal was not even the rule in
Jefferson Parish, rather, equality was the exception.
136. The Louisiana Constitution allowed political parties to set forth the rules governing their
primaries. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VIII, § 4. Subsequently, the political parties only allowed whites
to vote in their primaries. Powell, supra note 128, at 4.
137. Powell, supra note 128, at 4.
138. Id.
139. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); see also supra note 17.
140. LA. CONST. of 1921, art. VIII, § l(d). See also Powell, supra note 128, at 4-5.
141. Powell, supra note 128, at 4-5. The understanding clause came to be known as the
interpretation test. Id. at 4. See also Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 148-51 (1965).
142. Powell, supra note 128, at 5.
143. See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965), aff'g 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).
144. Powell, supra note 128, at 5.
145. Id. at 6.
146. The courts forced integration after prolonged litigation. See Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish Sch.
Bd., 332 F. Supp. 590 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd, 456 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 978
(1972).
147. Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 113, 1118 (E.D. La. 1986)
("[F]acilities and instruction provided to black children were qualitatively inferior to those provided to
whites").
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B. The Effects of Discrimination on the Black Community
Discrimination has taken its toll on blacks in Jefferson Parish. Racial
discrimination has risen to a level that "hinder[s] their ability to participate
effectively in the political process."' 48 In nearly all socio-economic areas,
blacks suffer disadvantages compared with whites. According to the 1980
census,149 less than 50% of blacks over the age of twenty-five in
Jefferson parish held high school degrees, compared with a greater than
70% figure for whites. 5 More than 25% of blacks in the parish had not
completed the eighth grade. Only 16% of whites were so unfortunate.'
These social disadvantages mean that blacks do not get the best jobs,'52
and in many cases, blacks do not get jobs at all in Jefferson Parish.'53
On the whole, black people have lower incomes than whites. 54 In fact,
25% of black families in Jefferson lived near the poverty line in 1980.'
At the same time, only 5% of white families in the parish were similarly
situated. 6
The educational deficiencies and the economic disadvantages produced
by the decades of discrimination have combined to prevent blacks from
effectively participating in the political process.'57 Blacks do not believe
that they can influence the system, 5 ' and they often do not have the
148. See supra note 109 for discussion of the ability "to participate effectively in the political
process.
149. The 1980 Census is relevant because many of the cases involving Jefferson Parish originated
in the 1980s. See infra part III.C.
150. Powell, supra note 128, at 9 (citing 1980 Census of Population and Housing, Publication
PHC80-2-259).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 7-8. Slightly more than 10% of blacks in Jefferson Parish were professionals in 1980
while 25% of whites in the parish enjoyed professional careers. The statistics reverse when speaking
of "blue collar" jobs, with 29% of the black population holding such employment but only 12% of
white Jeffersonians performing blue collar work. Id.
153. Id. at 8.
154. Id. Per capita income for whites was $8,302 and $4,279 for blacks. Id. at 9 (citing 1980
Census of Population and Housing, Publication PHC80-2-259).
155. Id.
156. Powell, supra note 128, at 9.
157. See id. at 8. See generally S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA (1972).
158. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1119 ("[I]t is axiomatic 'when minorities are
faced with almost total exclusion from the ordinary channels of political participation and deprived of
any alternative means of exerting influence, their voter turnout and candidacy rates tend to drop.")
(quoting MINORITY VOTE DILUTION (C. Davidson ed., 1984)).
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resources to support their candidates."5 9
C. Two Influential Vote Dilution Cases in Jefferson Parish
1. Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna t60
Plaintiffs challenged an at-large electoral system in Gretna, a municipali-
ty of Jefferson Parish. 6' At the time of the suit, Gretna was the largest
incorporated municipality in Louisiana that used an at-large electoral
system.'62 Plaintiffs brought a class action suit and alleged that the at-
large system, coupled with a majority vote requirement, 6 ' denied them
the opportunity to participate in the electoral process and elect their
preferred candidates to the city's board of aldermen." 4  Even though
blacks comprised twenty-eight percent of the city's population, the system,
as operated, effectively assured that the white majority could defeat all
159. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 70.
If, because of inferior education and poor employment opportunities, blacks earn less than
whites, they will not be able to provide the candidates of their choice with the same level of
financial support that whites can provide theirs. Thus, electoral losses by candidates preferred
by the black community may well be attributable in part to the fact that their white opponents
outspent them.
Id.
160. 636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S.
905 (1989).
161. A similar case was brought in Westwego, another municipality in Jefferson Parish, but the two
cases parallel each other, and the information is duplicative. Blacks comprised only 11% of the
population in Westwego when the suit was brought. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs were successful after
a six year struggle in the courts. Westwego Citizens for Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d
1201 (5th Cir. 1989). The Fifth Circuit explicitly rejected the district court's contention that the Voting
Rights Act did not intend to reach small city governments. Id. at 1207. Perhaps more importantly for
the future of vote dilution cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that the three criteria given in Gingles were
merely threshold issues, and if they were met, then courts should use the totality of the circumstances
test to determine whether the plaintiffs had demonstrated a violation of § 2. Westwego Citizens for
Better Gov't v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991).
162. 636 F. Supp. at 1124. Gretna was incorporated under the Lawson Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 33.1 (wVest 1988)). The population at the time of the suit was 20,615. 636 F. Supp. at 1124.
163. LA. REv. STAT. §§ 18.511-.512 (West 1988). Sections 18.511 and 18.512 are the relevant
statutes governing the number of votes required to elect a candidate in an at-large election. Under these
statutes, voters may vote for as many candidates as there are vacancies to be filled. In the primary, all
candidates who receive a majority of the votes are elected unless there are more candidates who receive
a majority than there are positions. In that case, the candidates gaining the most votes fill the seats.
If fewer candidates than the number of positions receive a majority, then a run-off is held to fill the
remaining seats. It is conceivable that a candidate will not receive a majority of the votes and still be
elected in the run-off. Experts refer to this system as a "sliding minimum vote requirement." 636 F.
Supp. at 1124.
164. 636 F. Supp. at 1115.
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black candidates.' 65
The district court analyzed the evidence pursuant to the Zimmer factors
recognized in the legislative history to the 1982 amendment of section
2.166 It concluded that black citizens of Gretna had historically been the
victims of official discrimination 167 and, therefore, were not able to stand
on equal footing with whites in the electoral process. 6 The judge stated
that discrimination had led to a "lower socio-economic status" for blacks
and furthered their inability to participate effectively in the political
process.
169
Next, the district court examined the extent of black candidates' success
in Gretna and discovered that no black candidate had ever been elected in
the seventy-five year history of the city. In fact, only two candidates had
ever run for alderman. 1
70
The City argued, however, that blacks had elected candidates of their
choice because the white aldermen had consistently received support from
the black community.'7 ' Furthermore, the City argued that in fact one of
the black candidates had not received the support of the black communi-
ty.'72 Ultimately, the court rejected both arguments.'73
165. If whites voted along racial lines, then the most support that a black candidate could receive
was 28%-100% of the black vote. Id. at 1118.
166. See supra note 102. The district court heard the case before the decision in Gingles. See
supra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
167. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1116-18. Black Gretna residents either attended
the uncertified high school, Rosenwald, or commuted to Orleans Parish. Id. at 1118 n.9. Only 40%
of blacks in Gretna over the age of twenty-five had graduated high school. Id. at 1118. Consequently,
blacks held lower paying jobs and were more likely to be unemployed than whites in Gretna. Id. See
also supra text accompanying notes 144-54.
168. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 113 1. The court concluded that when minorities
are not included in the process, they believe that they cannot exert any influence and, therefore, do not
vote. Id. at 1119.
169. Id. See also S. REp. No. 417, supra note 3, at 29 n.l 14, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
207. The court also concluded that these factors led to special interests and gave rise to the need for
candidates who would be sympathetic to these interests. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at
1119-20.
170. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1120. Edward Romain ran in 1973, and Leo
Jones ran in 1977 and 1979.
171. Id. at 1121.
172. Id. The City argued that Leo Jones had not received the support of either the Westside
Citizens Committee or the Black Caucus in either of his bids for election.
173. Id. at 1121. The court derisively dispelled the first argument. Judge Collins analogized the
argument to Henry Ford's quip, "Any customer can have a car painted any color he wants so long as
it is black." Id. (quoting JAMES P. BARRY, HENRY FoRD AND MASS PRODUCTION 55 (1973)).
The court also found that Leo Jones was not a token candidate. It concluded that Mr. Jones had
respectably finished ninth out of twelve candidates and fourth out of seven candidates in the elections.
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Finally, the court considered the impact of racially polarized voting. The
problem presented was that under the totality of the circumstances test,
plaintiffs had to prove vote dilution based upon a "particularized local
appraisal." However, the citizens of Gretna had only three occasions to
vote for black candidates, 74 and two of those elections had been held
before the City had begun keeping records enabling them to determine
polarization. 75 The issue before the court, then, was whether a limited
opportunity to vote for black candidates exhibited sufficient proof of
polarization. 76 After examining statistical data,'77 the court held that
there was substantial evidence of racial bloc voting within the City.7 '
Finally, the court found that every relevant factor'79 pointed to the
conclusion that the at-large system used in Gretna prevented black voters
from participating equally with white voters in the electoral process. 180
The court also noted that Mr. Jones had spent an amount of money equivalent to the amount spent by
other candidates in the elections. Id. Finally, the court determined that Mr. Jones had campaigned
heavily and that he was a viable leader as a former police deputy. Id. at 1121-22.
174. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1120.
175. Id. at 1125.
176. Id. at 1124-25, 1133.
177. The court heard the testimony ofDr. Richard Engstrom and Professor Michael McDonald, both
of whom had studied elections in Gretna. They studied two elections for alderman and two exogenous
elections: Jesse Jackson in the 1984 Democratic primary and Ben Jeffers' campaign for Louisiana
Secretary of State in 1979. Id. at 1125-29. They based their studies on "two complimentary methods
of analysis": (1) correlation and regression analysis and (2) homogenous precinct analysis. Id. The
studies showed that blacks voted for black candidates between 60% and 67% of the time in the
aldermanic elections. For the same elections, whites voted between .9% and 12% for black candidates.
Id. at 1126. In the exogenous elections, blacks in Gretna voted for the two black candidates at a rate
of 70% to 95%. Less than 8% of whites voted for the two candidates. Id.
178. Id. at 1131. The court extracted one piece of evidence that pointed directly to racial bloc
voting that even a layman can understand. In the 1973 election, Edward Romain ran for alderman
against nonincumbents. He is a light-skinned black. He campaigned heavily in white neighborhoods
with his light-skinned daughters and deliberately did not campaign with his darker-skinned sons. The
whites did not realize that he was black, and he qualified for the run-off. Between the elections, the
local newspaper printed that Mr. Romain would have a chance to be the first black alderman in Gretna,
He finished last in every white precinct where he had shown so favorably just weeks before. Id at
1130.
179. Id. at 1122-24. The court held that a nonpartisan slating group controlled the candidacies for
political offices in Gretna. Id. at 1122. The court also found that the slating group was not open to
blacks. Id. The court concluded that Gretna was an unusually large district, that a majority vote
requirement existed, and that there was no provision that candidates had to run from a particular
subdistrict. Id. at 1124. The court recognized that the Fifth Circuit had characterized these provisions
as "enhancing factors" in vote dilution cases. Id.
180. Citizens for a Better Gretna, 636 F. Supp. at 1131. The court stated that the totality of the
circumstances resulted in the "submergence of black registered voters in the City of Gretna as a voting
minority with substantially less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court decision."' The
court clarified one point in the district court's opinion. As noted, the City
had argued that in one election blacks had given a higher percentage of
their votes to two white candidates than the single black candidate, and
therefore, that the black candidate was not the preferred candidate of the
black community." 2 The court concluded that such a result was inevita-
ble because each voter could cast five votes in the at-large election.183
Furthermore the court held that that fact, in and of itself, did not mean that
blacks did not vote for black candidates as a bloc.'84
2. East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson'
A seven-seat parish council governs Jefferson Parish.'86 Prior to this
suit, voters elected council members from four single-member districts,'8 7
two floterial districts (combined single-member districts),' and one from
political process, thereby depriving the black voters of their lawful right to elect representatives of their
choice." Id.
181. 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 905 (1989). The Supreme Court had
issued the Gingles decision in the meantime. However, the Fifth Circuit held that the Gingles decision
did not render the district court's analysis and holding obsolete. Id. at 497.
182. Id. at 502.
183. Id.
184. Id. The Court noted that it would be "unavoidable" for certain white candidates to receive
a large portion of black votes because there was only one black candidate and a person could vote for
five individuals. Id.
185. 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988), aff'd, 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991). This case was
preceded by a suit challenging the parish council's districting plan as violative of the one man, one vote
principle. Cedric Floyd v. Parish of Jefferson, C.A. No. 86-0625 (E.D. La. 1986). The plaintiffs and
the parish agreed to reapportion the districts in order to remedy the violation. The plaintiffs hoped that
the Department of Justice would then invalidate the parish's scheme as violative of § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. However, the Department of Justice validated the new districts over the plaintiffs'
objection. The plaintiffs then filed this suit under § 2 of the Act. 691 F. Supp. at 994.
186. In 1958, Jefferson Parish residents voted to change the form of local government from a 17-
member police jury to the 7-seat council. At the time, the change of form of government was
predicated on a change in power structure. The change took place because of concern that the police
jurors' efforts were limited to their respective wards and not the parish as a whole. Donald N. Kearns,
The Politics of Change: A Case Study of Jefferson Parish 20 (1968) (on file with the Washington
University Law Quarterly). Purposeful discrimination against blacks in Jefferson Parish was not the
motive for change because few blacks lived in the parish at the time. Citizensfor a Better Gretna, 636
F. Supp. at 1117.
187. 691 F. Supp. at 994. Districts were divided so that two, I and 2, were on the west bank of
the Mississippi River and two, 3 and 4, were on the east bank of the river. Interview with Jack Grant,
Counsel, Jefferson Parish School Board, in Kenner, La. (Dec. 22, 1992).
188. 691 F. Supp. at 994. Districts I and 2 elected one councilman at-large, and districts 3 and 4
elected a separate councilman at-large.
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the parish at-large.'89 The plaintiffs brought the suit under the Voting
Rights Act 9' and alleged that the three-tiered electoral system coupled
with a majority vote requirement deprived black citizens of their right to
elect the candidates of their choice. 9'
The district court focused on the three threshold conditions necessary for
a vote dilution suit: the cohesiveness of the black community, the existence
of a white voting bloc, and the geographical concentration of black citizens
in the parish. 92 The district court held that significant evidence existed
to prove that the black people in Jefferson Parish voted as a unified group
and that the white community voted in a bloc to defeat the black
community's preferred candidates. 93 Because only four black candidates
had run for council seats, 94 the court considered extraneous elections,
and not just parish council elections, in order to understand the voting
patterns within the parish more clearly.'95 With few exceptions, black
189. Id. This final seat was for the council chairman.
190. Id. at 993-94. The plaintiffs also alleged that the system violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id.
191. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp. at 993. The 1980 Census showed that the voting age
population was 314,323. Whites comprised 268,878 (85.5%) of that figure and blacks 37,039 (11.8%).
Sixty-four percent of whites were registered to vote compared to 63% of blacks. Id. at 995 (citing 1980
Census).
192. Id. at 997. See also supra notes 112-14. The court heard this case after the Gingles decision
and, therefore, followed the three-part test set forth in that opinion. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F.
Supp. at 997. See supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text for a discussion of Gingles.
193. 691 F. Supp. at 1004. The court studied recent elections in Jefferson Parish in order to decide
whether the vote was split along racial lines. Id. at 1000. The experts relied on two complementary
methods to determine polarization.
194. Eugene Fitchue ran for the council from district 2 in 1975. Id. at 1002. Herbert Wallace ran
for the same seat in 1979. Id. at 1003. In 1983, two black candidates ran for the council: Leon
Williams ran for the district 3-4 at-large seat, and Robert Hamilton ran for the district 2 seat. Id.
195. Generally, polarization is characterized by a strong white bloc vote that defeats a minority bloc
vote plus any white crossover vote. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 56.
In the 1975 election, candidate Fitchue received 6.5% of the total vote-approximately 46% of the
black vote and less than 2% of the white vote. He did not qualify for the general election but would
have qualified had the election been among black voters only. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp.
at 1002-03.
In the 1979 election candidate Wallace received 5.9% of the total vote-between 36 and 40% of the
black vote and less than 2% of the white vote. Wallace was not the clear choice of the black voters.
A white candidate, James Lawson, the incumbent, received between 33 and 35% of the black vote. He
too would have made the general election if the vote had been limited to the black community. Id. at
1003.
In 1983, neither black candidate garnered the support of the black voters. Instead, the black vote
was concentrated behind two other candidates, Willie Hof and Jimmy Lawson. Id. Both were
incumbents.
An expert for the plaintiffs analyzed twenty other elections involving black candidates since 1980.
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voters supported black candidates and white voters supported white
candidates.'96
The defense argued that the court should not consider the race of the
candidate in determining whether blacks had elected the candidate of their
choice.'97 However, the court recognized the importance of the
candidate's race as well as the race of the voter in its analysis. 9 This
holding was significant to the plaintiffs' claim of political cohesiveness.
The defense argued that blacks did not consistently vote as a unified group
because blacks did not always support the same candidate in an all-white
race.' 99 However, the court determined that the race of the candidates
was important00 and that it was clear that the black community voted as
a group when black candidates ran for office.20' In contrast, it was
equally clear to the court that white voters, as a whole, never supported
black candidates.20 2
To this point, the plaintiffs had proved two of the three issues-a
cohesive black vote and a white bloc that consistently defeated their vote.
However, the plaintiffs could not meet all three of the Gingles criteria. The
court held that the black population was widely dispersed throughout the
parish." 3 Therefore, the plaintiffs had not proved that the community
was compact enough to be a majority in a single-member district.2"
He found that fifteen of those elections exhibited polarization. Only two of the black candidates were
elected, and they were elected in majority black districts. Wilma Irvin was elected to the Kenner City
Council, and Herbert Wallace was elected as constable in the 7th District Justice Court. Id. at 1004.
196. 691 F. Supp. at 1004.
197. Id. at 1001. The City relied on the plurality in Gingles which concluded that the race of the
candidate is irrelevant in the determination of the preferred candidate. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 67. The
City contended that this evidence proved (I) that the white candidate was the preferred candidate of the
black community and (2) that blacks did not vote cohesively. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp.
at 1001. The court pointed out that such an argument doubled back on itself: "The apparent double
meaning of defendants' argument is that the race of the candidate is unimportant when considering bloc
voting, but important in determining political cohesiveness." Id.
198. The court's holding followed the Fifth Circuit's lead in Citizensfor a Better Gretna. East
Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp. at 1001. However, the Fifth Circuit is at odds with the Eleventh
Circuit. In Carrollton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1557 (11th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Duncan v. Carrollton, 485 U.S. 936 (1988), the Eleventh Circuit chose to follow
Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Gingles. See supra notes 107-15.
199. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp. at 1001.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1002-04.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1006.
204. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15, 46 n.12 (stating that the Court had no occasion to consider
what relief should be given to a minority group that cannot comprise a majority in a single-member
1994]
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Accordingly, there was no remedy."5
Nevertheless, the court held that the three-tiered system 5 violated
section 2,207 and although the black community might not have been able
to elect a candidate of its own, it was capable of influencing elections.0 8
The court ordered the council to reapportion its districts." 9 The
groundbreaking nature of the district court's decision-that an influence
district was an appropriate remedy in a section 2 suit-was lost, however,
because the court subsequently amended its finding that the black
community was widely dispersed in the parish."0
D. Jefferson Parish After the Voting Rights Act
The citizens of Jefferson Parish have benefitted from the Voting Rights
Act. With the help of section 6, 63% of blacks were registered to vote in
district).
205. The plaintiffs did bring a reapportionment plan to court with a 56% black majority district.
However, the plaintiffs' plan envisioned seven single-member districts, and the majority district was
a 35-sided district which crossed the Mississippi River and divided cities in order to include pockets
of black population. The court rejected the plaintiffs' plan because it was a "manipulation of district
lines" and because a court must follow guidelines and "fix boundaries that are compact, contiguous, and
that preserve natural political and traditional representation." East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp.
at 1007 (quoting Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1163 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb.
1981)).
206. The defense argued that the three-tiered system allowed each voter a chance to choose three
representatives, but the court noted that this argument was meritless. The effect of the system was to
block the vote of the black community. Id. at 1007-08.
207. Id. at 1006. The court reasoned that if it were to read Gingles to hold that plaintiffs did not
have a vote dilution case unless they could constitute a majority in a single-member district, then it
would necessarily be guaranteeing proportional representation. Id. at 1005.
208. Id. at 1006 ("Nor does that relief require a single-member district with a majority of black
voters.").
209. Id. at 1008. The court deferred to the quasilegislative body to propose its own solution. The
court could not force its views on the council. See East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 706
F. Supp. 470, 471 (E.D. La. 1989) (on remand), aff'd, 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991).
210. East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 492. In accordance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
the council submitted to the Department of Justice a plan with a 46% black district. The Department
refused to accept the council's plan. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to Harry A. Rosenberg, Counsel for Parish of
Jefferson, Phelps, Dunbar, Marks, Claverre & Sims (Nov. 17, 1989) (Exhibit I to Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae, East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, No. 86-3668 (E.D. La. 1990)).
The Department noted that several alternative plans contained districts with a black majority district and
that the council had given no valid reason for refusing those plans. Id. at 2. In an amicus brief to the
district court, the Department urged the district judge to reevaluate his finding that the black population
was "too widely dispersed" throughout Jefferson Parish for the reason that significant changes in the
population had occurred since the 1980 Census. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, East
Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, No. 86-3668 (E.D. La. 1990).
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Jefferson Parish in 1990.1' That simply was not possible before
1965.2" Section 5 also continues to have a significant impact in Jeffer-
son Parish.213 Because of section 5, Jefferson Parish must gain pre-
approval from the Department of Justice for all proposed changes in voting
laws 14  Examples of "changes in voting laws" include redistricting
parish council, school board, and state legislative seats. It also includes the
addition of judicial seats" 5 and settlement agreements in section 2
litigation."' In this manner, section 5 has prevented Jefferson Parish
from dodging the law as it did so successfully for almost 100 years.
217
Notwithstanding the impact these sections of the Voting Rights Act have
had, section 2 has made the greatest impact on voting rights in the black
community. Even though its effects were not felt until recently,
218
section 2 has provided the black community in Jefferson Parish with
heroes, purpose, and hope: section 2 has empowered black voters.
These heroes may not be recognized by name by many, not even in
Jefferson Parish. These heroes are Edward Romain and Leo Jones, 21
9
Eugene Fitchue, Herbert Wallace, Leon Williams, and Robert Hamil-
ton.22 These black men ran for office in the 1970s and early 1980s
when black candidates had virtually no chance to win in Jefferson Parish.
But they laid the foundation for the later successful vote dilution cases. In
order to show under section 2 that the black community votes in unity and
that whites vote in blocs and consistently defeat black candidates, 22' there
211. 1990 Census of Population and Housing, File Tape 3A.
212. See supra note 36.
213. See THERNSTROM, supra note 3, at 237 ("Section 5, by all accounts, is a drastic provision....
The burden is on the jurisdiction to prove the racial neutrality of its action beyond any doubt."); see
also East Jefferson Coalition, 926 F.2d at 490 (quoting the Department of Justice in its objection to a
redistricting plan because the plan "may well have been motivated by an invidious purpose to minimize
black voting strength").
214. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 41-43 and accompanying
text.
215. See Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
216. See supra note 210.
217. See supra part II.A.
218. See supra part II.C. Citizens for a Better Gretna was the first successful section 2 suit brought
in Jefferson Parish, and it was not decided until 1989. See supra part Ill.C.I.
219. See supra note 170. Mr. Romain and Mr. Jones ran for alderman in Gretna in the 1970s.
220. See supra note 194. These men ran for the Jefferson Parish Council and lost in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.
221. See supra notes 109-14 (discussing the Gingles three-part test).
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must have been unsuccessful black candidates in the past.222 These men
entered races that they could not win, but the results in these elections
allowed statisticians to gather evidence from the elections that would be
used to prove in court that blacks voted together and that whites always
voted against them.2z  Simply put, these men opened the door for
plaintiffs to bring successful section 2 cases.
Section 2 has provided purpose to members of the black community who
have banded together to form groups aimed at civic progress.22 4  For
years, these groups have pooled their resources and their time in order to
bring successful cases under section 2. Each successful case, in turn, has
empowered black voters in Jefferson Parish.
Section 2 has proved to be a catalyst, albeit twenty-five years after the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act. Since 1990, the voters of Jefferson
Parish have elected their first black member to the school board,225 their
first black member to the parish council,226 their first black representative
to the Louisiana House of Representatives since the Reconstruction,2 7
and two black judges. 8  Unfortunately, however, the effects of discrimi-
nation still exist, and section 2 cannot provide blacks with a better
education or employment or a higher income. Yet, thanks to those who
struggled in the past, today blacks have a voice in the political process to
help build the future. Section 2 has helped make this progress possible.
222. See S. REP. No. 417, supra note 3, at 28-39, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 206-07. All
of the factors enumerated in the Senate Report focus on the particular situations in the particular
subdivision in which the litigation is based. See also supra note 102 for the text of the Senate Report
factors.
223. See supra notes 176-77 and 193-95 and accompanying text
224. Citizens for a Better Gretna, the East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development, and
the Fifth Ward Association are a few of these civic groups.
225. Cedric Floyd won an election after the school board settled with the plaintiffs to create a black
majority district in 1989 in Fifth Ward Precinct IA. Coalition and Progressive Ass'n v. Jefferson Parish
Sch. Bd., No. Civ. A. 86-2963, 1989 WL 3801 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 1989). Interview with Cedric Floyd,
in Kenner, La. (Dec. 22, 1992).
226. Donald Jones won an election in a black majority district created by the final settlement in
East Jefferson Coalition v. Parish of Jefferson, 926 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1991). Interview with Cedric
Floyd, supra note 225.
227. Kyle Mark Green won an election in 1991 after the reapportionment of the state legislature.
Interview with Cedric Floyd, supra note 225.
228. Judges Melvin Zeno and Alan Green were elected in 1992 after the parish signed a consent
decree in Clark v. Roemer, No. 86-3498 (E.D. La. 1991), consolidating two black-majority judicial
districts out of sixteen districts. Interview with Judge Melvin Zeno, in Gretna, La. (Dec. 18, 1992).
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IV. THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Jefferson Parish and its vote dilution cases have afforded considerable
insight into the past and the potential future of the Voting Rights Act.
However, the cases have revealed some inherent problems in the Act which
in the end will cause it to become obsolete. Redistricting has become so
problematic that remedies under section 2 will be impossible to establish.
However, even if the Voting Rights Act loses remedial potential, unity and
education will enable minorities to build on the foundation of the Act and
achieve greater political involvement.
In East Jefferson Coalition, district court Judge Peter H. Beer recognized
two redistricting problems, both of which recently came before the United
States Supreme Court. First, Judge Beer was unwilling to allow plaintiffs
to draw a 35-sided district in order to create a majority district. 9 He
held that a redistricting plan must "fix boundaries that are compact[,]
contiguous and that preserve natural, political and traditional representa-
tion. 23° In effect, he held that racial gerrymandering was not a permissi-
ble remedy. Second, he recognized an "influence district" as an appropriate
alternative to racial gerrymandering.23" '
Recently, the Supreme Court has addressed both of these issues. In
Shaw v. Reno, 2 the Court held that white plaintiffs did have a cause of
action against the State of North Carolina for redistricting legislation that
was a blatant effort to segregate the races for election purposes.233 White
plaintiffs had brought suit against the state alleging that a district that
weaved through the state until it could capture enough black communities
to create a black majority district violated the Equal Protection Clause.234
The district court dismissed the suit.235 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that although intentional creation of minority-majority districts is
not a per se violation of the Constitution, it could be a violation if the state
did not have "sufficient justification" for segregating persons into districts
229. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp. at 1007.
230. Id. (quoting Wyche v. Madision Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151, 1163 (5th Cir. Unit A Feb.
1981)).
231. East Jefferson Coalition, 691 F. Supp. at 1006. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
232. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993).
233. Id. at 2824 (stating that the scheme was "so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally
[could] be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting").
234. Id. at 2821.
235. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461, 473 (E.D.N.C. 1992), rev'd sub nom. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S.
Ct. 2816 (1993).
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because of their race.z 6
In Voinovich v. Quilter,17 the Supreme Court effectively rejected
"influence" districts as remedies to section 2 violations. In 1990, the Ohio
Legislature set out to reapportion the legislative districts. The Republican-
dominated apportionment board adopted a scheme that "packed" blacks into
districts in order to create black majority districts.238 In the past,
however, black voters had been successful in electing their candidates even
in districts where they represented only 35% of the registered voters, so
there was no need to create majority districts.239  Democratic leaders
brought suit alleging that the new scheme diluted the strength of the black
vote and thus constituted illegal "packing."2 4 The district court held that
the apportionment board could not create black majority districts absent a
violation of section 2.241
The Supreme Court reversed the district court.242 It held that the state
did not violate the Voting Rights Act by creating a black-majority district
absent a section 2 violation.243 Additionally, the Court held that the
plaintiffs could not prove that the apportionment plan had diluted the black
vote.2' Citing Gingles, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs could not
have proved that the white vote consistently defeated the black vote-the
third prong of the Gingles test-and consequently could not have met their
burden of proof.245
The Court specifically stated that it did not decide whether influence-
dilution claims were valid.2" However, the Court appeared to reject
these claims anyway. The Court stated that the plaintiffs could not have
succeeded in bringing a section 2 suit because there was no proof of
racially polarized voting. The Court's decision makes sense because blacks
were fighting to maintain influence districts, indicating that there must have
236. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2828.
237. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993).
238. Quilter v. Voinovich, 794 F. Supp. 695, 598 (N.D. Ohio 1992).
239. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. at 1154.
240. Quilter, 794 F. Supp. at 695-96.
241. Id. at 701.
242. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832.
243. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. at 1156. The Court indeed stated that federal courts could not order
reapportionment without a showing of a § 2 violation, but the Court noted that the states are not
prohibited from doing so. Id. However, the Court left open the issue whether the apportionment
scheme violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 1157.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1155.
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been a significant white crossover vote. The effectiveness of influence
districts depends on the crossover vote. Clearly if there were no crossover
vote, blacks would not have sued to have the district maintained. What the
Court declares it will consider another day, it has already constructively
condemned. The question then remains whether the Court effectively
precluded influence districts as valid remedies.
Another problem with redistricting not addressed in the Jefferson Parish
cases but which may nonetheless spell the end of the Voting Rights Act's
effectiveness is the absence of an appropriate remedy for a situation in
which it is necessary to take majority districts away from one minority
group in order to give majority districts to a second minority group. The
Supreme Court is currently addressing this issue.247
These three Supreme Court cases call attention to the difficulties that
states, their subdivisions, and federal district courts encounter when
attempting to redistrict. Many of the ingenious remedies were not
contemplated by Congress in 1965 or 1982. The problems associated with
redistricting, as well as the "boundaries" of section 2, may lead to the
conclusion that the Voting Rights Act must be restructured, if not
completely rewritten, in the near future.
B. The "Boundaries" of Section 2
Section 2 has inherent boundaries which are generally not addressed in
the Act. The best way to explain this phenomenon is to compare section
2 to the first hill of a rollercoaster. Once one boards a rollercoaster, she
anticipates anxiously the slow, methodical trip to the summit of that first
and largest hill of the ride. It seems to take forever, but as she reaches the
top, she realizes that she will soon be flying toward the bottom of that hill
with enough momentum to propel her up the next.
Black people in Jefferson Parish have been on a similar ride. For
twenty-four years, the black community in Jefferson Parish anticipated the
first successful black candidate. The heroes who ran in races they could
not win248 were laying the foundation for successful section 2 cas-
es-helping the rollercoaster on its uphill journey. They were losing
elections but accumulating the statistical evidence required for successful
247. Oral argument has been heard in DeGrandy v. Johnson, Nos. 92-593, 92-519, and 92-767.
Elections: Voting Rights Act, 62 U.S.L.W. 3261 (Oct. 12, 1993). See DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F.
Supp. 1076 (N.D. Fla. 1992).
248. See supra notes 219-23 and accompanying text.
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section 2 suits. In 1989, Citizens for a Better Gretna was decided,249 and
blacks had finally crested that first hill. Success in the courts and at the
polls followed with amazing momentum.5 Soon blacks may be able to
claim that they are proportionally represented in every aspect of the parish
government. But section 2 is only the first hill.
V. CONCLUSION
Eventually, section 2 will enable the black community to reach
proportional representation in Jefferson Parish. At this point section 2 will
no longer be an effective tool. However, the black community can further
empower itself by utilizing the momentum that section 2 has brought to
Jefferson Parish.
The black community will have to unite, register its voters, vote, and
feed on the hope that each new candidate brings. Community leaders must
stress education, awareness, and confidence. They must not be complacent
when section 2 has run its course. The leaders of the 1990s need only
remind the community of the black candidates of the 1970s and 1980s and
their bitter struggles so that the success may continue.
The door is open...
Jeffrey D. McMillen
249. See supra part IlI.C.1.
250. See supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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